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JUST HOW RELIABLE IS THE HUMAN MEMORY? THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF RECOVERED REPRESSED MEMORIES IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
Shannon Lynn Malone* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Whether the human mind is capable of locking away traumatic 
events as a coping mechanism to merely unravel the trauma in the 
years that follow is a phenomenon recognized as “repressed memo-
ries”1 or “dissociative amnesia.”2  The mystery of this phenomenon 
has long intrigued the psychiatric community and the debate has con-
tinued further to the judicial system.  The extension of crucial statutes 
of limitations in cases involving allegations of criminal child sexual 
abuse, by several jurisdictions, may further the admission of testimony 
relating to recovered memories and dissociative amnesia in child sex-
ual abuse cases.3   Notwithstanding the safeguards proclaimed to en-
sure that expert witness testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant, 
otherwise reliable, relevant, and admissible testimony may still be sup-
pressed on the ground that its potential for unfair prejudice substan-
tially outweighs its probative value.4    
 
* Second year law student at Touro Law Center, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, class of 
December 2020, Stony Brook University B.A. (2016).  I would like to thank the Hon. Mark 
D. Cohen, Supervising Judge of County Court, Court of Claims Judge and Acting Supreme 
Court Justice, New York Supreme Court 10th Judicial District, and Samuel J. Levine, Profes-
sor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute at Touro Law Center, Jacob D. Fuchsberg 
Law Center for their steady support and guidance; furthermore, I am grateful for their thought-
ful comments throughout this project. 
1  Com. v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 759, 919 N.E.2d 1254, 1262 (2010). 
2 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 478 (4th ed. 1994). 
3 See 33A CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 186:12. (2019). 
4 State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 68-69, 733 S.E.2d 535, 540 (2012) (citing Rule 403, Excluding 
Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or Other Reasons and the court 
in State v. Coffey, 345 N.C. 389, 404, 480 S.E.2d 664, 673 (1997) holding that: “the trial court 
still must determine whether [the expert testimony’s] probative value outweighs the danger of 
1
Malone: Admissibility of Recovered Memories
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019
1196 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
Repressed memories of sexual abuse have been admitted into 
evidence supplemented by expert witness testimony in several civil tri-
als throughout the country.  Notably, in a 1995 federal case,  Isely v. 
Capuchin Province,5  the district court allowed the plaintiff’s treating 
therapist to testify as an expert witness concerning repressed memories 
which were unearthed through extensive therapy.6  Though courts have 
been reluctant to admit such testimony in criminal proceedings, the 
court in Isley announced guidelines by which repressed memories may 
be admitted in a criminal trial.7  Thereafter, the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of California found expert witness tes-
timony regarding recovered repressed memories properly admissible 
within the context of a first-degree murder trial later that year.8 Thus, 
the court in Franklin v. Duncan9  held:10   
. . .[R]eliance by a jury on “recovered memory” testi-
mony does not, in and of itself, violate the Constitution. 
Then as now, such testimony is admitted into evidence 
 
unfair prejudice to defendant”); See also State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 26, 366 S.E.2d 459, 
463 (1988) (holding that otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded “if its probative 
value is outweighed by the danger that it would confuse the issues before the court or mislead 
the jury”); State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 41, 347 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1986) (citing the holding in 
State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 731, 340 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1986) in which the court held the 
determination as to whether to allow or exclude evidence pursuant to Rule 403 is a determi-
nation left within “the sound discretion of the trial court.”). Id. 
5 Isely v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1066-67 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 
6 In Isely v. Capuchin Province, the court allowed the plaintiff’s treating therapist to testify; 
however, it limited the scope of the testimony to the expert’s opinion; Shahzade v. Gregory, 
923 F. Supp. 286, 44 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 646 (D. Mass. 1996) (citing Isley in holding that a 
witness may testify to an alleged sexual assault occurring fifty years prior); Doe v. Roe, 191 
Ariz. 313 (1998) (upholding the admissibility of recovered repressed memories into evidence 
in a civil trial and allowed a tolling of the statute of limitations for tort claims: “Under the 
discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or with reasonable 
diligence should know the facts underlying the cause.  The rationale offered for the discovery 
rule is that it is unjust to deprive a plaintiff of a cause of action before the plaintiff has a 
reasonable basis for believing that a claim exists.”). Id.  See also § 56:31.  Jurisdictions ad-
mitting testimony based on repressed-then-restored memory, 7 Jones on Evidence § 56:31. 
7 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1259. 
8 Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (N.D. Cal.), aff’d, 70 F.3d 75 (9th Cir. 1995). 
9 Id. 
10 In Franklin v. Duncan, the appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after being 
convicted of first-degree murder in relation to the murder of his daughter’s childhood friend 
nearly twenty-years following the slaying.  Id.  The conviction in this case was based largely 
on the defendant’s daughter recovering the repressed memory of witnessing her father murder 
her childhood friend.  Id.  Though the court upheld the admissibility of such testimony, it 
granted the appellant’s writ of habeas corpus, holding that the prosecuting attorney violated 
the appellant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights on grounds unrelated to the analysis of dis-
sociative amnesia.  Id.   
2
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and is then tested as to credibility by the time-honored 
procedures of the adversary system. Admissibility of 
the memory is but the first step; it does not establish 
that the memory is worthy of belief. In this regard men-
tal health experts will undoubtedly, as they must, con-
tinue their debate on whether or not the “recovered 
memory” phenomenon exists, but they can never estab-
lish whether or not the asserted memory is true. That 
must be a function of the trial process.11 
The analytical process promulgated in Franklin was defini-
tively applied by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2010, 
in Commonwealth v. Shanley,12 where the court held expert witness 
testimony supporting the validity of dissociative amnesia admissible 
under the two-prong Frye13 and Lanigan14  standard due to the nature 
of the debate among the relevant scientific community.15  The court in 
Shanley upheld the lower court’s finding that expert witness testimony 
on recovered repressed memories and dissociative amnesia was suffi-
ciently reliable to support its admission in a criminal sexual abuse case 
brought nearly twenty years following the cause of action.16  The court 
 
11 Id.  (holding further: “[b]y definition, trials are based on memories of the past.  The 
recognition that memory grows dim with the passage of time is part and parcel of the trial 
system.  Jurors are instructed that in assessing credibility they are to consider the ability of the 
witness to remember the event with the implicit assumption that asserted memories of events 
long past must be subject to rigorous scrutiny.  From the common sense perspective of the trial 
process, then, a memory which does not even exist for a long passage of time and then is 
“recovered” must be at least subject to that same rigorous scrutiny.  This case, then, may be 
described as a “recovered memory” case, but in reality it is a “memory” case like all others. 
After direct and cross examination, after consideration of extrinsic evidence that tends to cor-
roborate or to contradict the memory, the focus must be on the credibility, the believability, 
the truth of the asserted memory.  More specifically, from the perspective of this reviewing 
Court, the focus must be on the test of the credibility of the asserted memory which was con-
ducted in the trial itself.  Was it fair?  Was it, or was it not, tainted by impermissible violation 
of Constitutional principles?”).  Id. 
12 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1260. 
13 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
14 Com. v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (1994). 
15 In Com. v. Lanigan, the court urged the significance of the standard established in Daub-
ert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), 
where the Supreme Court held the standard for determining the validity of scientific testimony 
to be based on numerous factors, most notably, the changing opinions in the scientific com-
munity.  Id. 
16 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1259. 
3
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justified its ruling based on the testimony’s general acceptance in the 
scientific community and supporting case studies.17 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina recognized 
a means to introduce evidence arising from the recovery of a repressed 
memory without the introduction of expert witness testimony.18  In 
State v. King,19 the court discussed the conflicting opinions between 
two professors of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, both qualified 
as experts in the subject of psychiatry, specializing in repressed mem-
ories.20  As the court noted, “they disagree about almost everything.”21  
Although the court upheld the trial court’s suppression of expert testi-
mony relating to dissociative amnesia or repressed memories, it estab-
lished a method to introduce testimony concerning recovered repressed 
memories without the requisite expert witness testimony.22  Thus, the 
court in King held that lay witness testimony relating to alleged recov-
ered memories could be properly admitted into evidence as long as it 
does not violate any other statute or applicable rule of evidence.23  This 
decision demonstrates the difficulties in evaluating the legitimacy of 
recovered repressed memories due to contradictory opinions among 
leading experts specializing in the phenomenon and the consequent 
uncertainty.24  Furthermore, this evidentiary loophole creates a prob-
lematic standard by which future courts may circumvent the necessity 
of expert witness testimony.25 
 
17 Id. 
18 King, at 733 S.E.2d at 536. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 The defendant offered the testimony of Harrison G. Pope, Jr., M.D. and the state offered 
the testimony of Dr. Chu; both experts discussed the nature and reliability of repressed mem-
ories while ultimately disagreeing as to whether these memories are sufficiently reliable as to 
be admissible in a criminal proceeding.  Id. at 537. 
22 King, 733 S.E.2d, at 535-36 (holding “. . .[a]lthough we affirm the holding of the Court 
of Appeals majority that the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion, we disavow the 
portion of the opinion that, relying on an earlier opinion of that court, requires expert testimony 
always to accompany the testimony of a lay witness in cases involving allegedly recovered 
memories.”).  Id. 
23 Id. at 542. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 541 (“. . . holding, we stress that we are reviewing the evidence presented and the 
order entered in this case only.  We promulgate here no general rule regarding the admissibility 
or reliability of repressed memory evidence under either Rule 403 or Rule 702.  As the trial 
judge himself noted, scientific progress is “rapid and fluid.” Advances in the area of repressed 
memory are possible, if not likely. . .”).  Id. 
4
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Following this preliminary discussion of the relevant eviden-
tiary standards, the third section of this Note will analyze the inherent 
fallibility of human memory, as it affects the reliability of courtroom 
testimony.  The focus will be on determining whether an individual, 
most frequently a child, may repress traumatic events from his or her 
awareness and continue to discuss the possible manifestation of false 
memories and how an individual can wholeheartedly believe a decep-
tive memory of a traumatic experience.  The discussion will then con-
sider whether such memories should be admissible, as supported by 
expert witness testimony, in criminal proceedings.  The fourth section 
of this Note will examine the notion of implanted memories and the 
questionable therapeutic methods implemented to solicit the phenom-
enon.  Finally, this Note will conclude with an argument urging a care-
ful and critical approach when considering the weight and sufficiency 
of relevant factors in determining the credibility of scientific evidence 
as promulgated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.26 
II. COMMON LAW & STATUTORY BACKGROUND REGARDING 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
In order to assess the admission of expert witness testimony 
supporting the validity of recovered memories and dissociative amne-
sia, it is important to understand the procedural history regarding the 
introduction of scientific evidence. 
A.  Frye: The Strict “General Acceptance Rule” 
Half a century prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, a strict standard for the admission of expert testimony ac-
companying scientific evidence was precedent.27  In Frye v. United 
States,28 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the 
 
26 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 
469 (1993), the Court promulgated the numerous factors courts should consider when deter-
mining the admissibility of scientific evidence.  These standards include: (1) whether the ex-
pert’s theory and methodology can be or have been tested; (2) whether the expert’s theory and 
methodology have been subjected to peer-reviewed or publication; (3) the known or potential 
error rates for a particular technique; (4) any standards and controls applicable to the science; 
and (5) the degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific or expert community.  Id. 
27 The Federal Rules of Evidence took effect on July 1, 1973. FED. R. EVID. Refs & Annos. 
Fifty years earlier, in 1923, the standard in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) 
was promulgated. 
28 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
5
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lower court’s decision to deny the appellant’s offering of expert wit-
ness testimony concerning the outcome of a lie-detector test performed 
on the appellant.29  The court announced what is currently referred to 
as the strict “general acceptance” rule when determining the credibility 
and resulting admissibility of expert witness testimony relating to the 
introduction of scientific or otherwise technical or complex forms of 
evidence.30  Currently, the narrow standard is still applied in nine ju-
risdictions across the United States.31  This evidentiary standard may 
be found in an often-cited passage that previously served as precedent: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the 
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages 
is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone 
the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, 
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert 
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific 
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs.32 
Under Frye, expert witness testimony based on one or more 
scientific theories or methodologies is admissible only if it is generally 
accepted as credible in the applicable scientific community.33  This 
community encompasses individuals with the “special experience or 
knowledge” necessary for the formation of a meaningful opinion on 
the “science, art, or trade.”34  The general acceptance standard prom-
ulgated in Frye embeds a strict burden on the proponent of new or con-
troversial scientific methodologies in the context of expert witness 
 
29 Id. at 1013. 
30 “Under the Frye ‘general acceptance’ test, scientific evidence is admissible at trial only 
if the methodology or scientific principle upon which the opinion is based is sufficiently es-
tablished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs; “general 
acceptance” does not mean universal acceptance and it does not require that the methodology 
in question be accepted by unanimity, consensus, or even a majority of experts, but rather 
means that the underlying method used to generate an expert’s opinion is reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the relevant field.”  See N. Tr. Co. v. Burandt & Armbrust, LLP, 403 Ill. 
App. 3d 260, 933 N.E.2d 432 (2010). 
31 1 Expert Witness Checklists § 1:301 (3d ed.) 
32 Frye 293 F. at 1014. 
33 Id. at 1013. 
34 Id. 
6
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testimony.35  Accordingly, under Frye, the admissibility of scientific 
testimony is based solely on the predominant opinion within the rele-
vant specified scientific community, allowing for a uniform standard 
in permitting scientific-based expert testimony.36  Consequently, under 
Frye, the standard of review in permitting such testimony is strict.37  
Nevertheless, such an unequivocal standard allows for certain applica-
tion and predictable results.  Therefore, the rule promulgated in Frye 
entrusts the relevant scientific community with the task of ruling on 
the merits of novel concepts, research, and diagnoses, further safe-
guarding the trustworthiness of such evidence when admitted by 
means of expert witness testimony. 
Although once the prominent authority in the admission of ex-
pert witness testimony, currently, fewer than ten states apply the Frye 
standard when determining whether or not it should allow an expert 
witness to testify.38  This is because of the evolving nature of scientific-
testimony and the need to evaluate the merits of each novel scientific 
methodology or theory, individually, within the context of the specific 
case at bar.  Though most jurisdictions have broadened their standards 
regarding expert witness testimony by employing a rule that mirrors 
the Federal Rules of Evidence,39 precisely nine states still apply some 
version of the standard established in Frye.  These jurisdictions in-
clude:   
(1) Florida, where Frye is only applicable when an ex-
pert’s testimony is related to a breaking or novel scien-
tific theory or method.40   
 
35 The rule promulgated in Daubert henceforth made general acceptance within the relevant 
scientific community, merely, one of many factors in determining the admissibility of novel 
scientific or otherwise technical testimony.  See Dwight A. Kern & Robert J. Kenney, Jr., Frye 
Meets Parker and the Effect on Toxic Exposure Cases, N.Y. ST. B.J., March/April 2007, at 26-
27.  The more flexible Daubert test demoted the Frye “general acceptance” standard to just 
one of several admissibility components for expert testimony.  Id. 
36 1 Expert Witness Checklists § 1:301 (3d ed.) 
37 Kern, supra note 35. 
38 Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w-
017-6355.  See also notes 36-44. 
39 Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w-
017-6355. 
40 See DeLisle v. Crane Co., 2018 WL 5075302, at *8 (Fla. Oct. 15, 2018) (holding Florida 
statute § 90.72 unconstitutional when authorities attempted to replace the rule established in 
Frye with the more flexible Daubert standard; see also Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 
1166-67 (Fla. 1995) (detailing Florida’s reasoning for upholding Frye).  Standard for Exclud-
ing Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w-017-6355. 
7
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(2) Illinois, where Frye is applied in a uniform manner 
when determining the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony.41   
(3)  Iowa, which enforces its own codified rule in regard 
to expert witnesses, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Evidence 
702 which governs expert testimony and requires:   
(a) all evidence to be relevant to the case at issue,   
(b) the expert’s knowledge to be based on scientific, 
specialized, or technique knowledge, for the purpose of 
assisting the trier of fact, and   
(c) the expert must possess the required skills, 
knowledge, training, experience, or education to effec-
tively assist the trier of fact; however, when testimony 
relates to any novel or complex scientific theories or 
methodologies, the state of Iowa requires the testimony 
to meet the stricter burden promulgated in Frye.42   
(4) Maryland established a similar rule to Frye, the 
Frye-Reed standard, which allows expert testimony 
only when the expert is offered with the purpose of 
bridging “the analytical gap between accepted science 
and the expert’s ultimate conclusions.”43   
(5) Minnesota explicitly rejected the standard estab-
lished in Daubert, by conversely applying a variation 
of Frye, the Frye-Mack standard requiring all novel sci-
entific evidence to be found generally acceptable within 
the scientific community before allowing such testi-
mony.44   
(6) New Jersey applies a broad and malleable standard, 
which mirrors the Federal Rules and Daubert, in all 
 
41 ILL. R. EVID. 702; see also In re Commitment of Simons, 213 Ill. 2d 523, 529-30 (2004); 
see also Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist 
w-017-6355. 
42 IOWA R. EVID. 702; Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 628 (Iowa 2000); Leaf v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Iowa 1999).   
43 Savage v. State, 166 A.3d 183, 195-96 (Md. 2017); MD. RULE 5-702; see also Blackwell 
v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 241-43, 250-56 (Md. 2009).   
44 Goeb v. Tharaldson, 614 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000); MINN. R. EVID. 702; see also 
Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 156 (Minn. 2012).   
8
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civil cases, and by contrast, applies the rigid Frye stand-
ard in all criminal proceedings.45   
(7) New York remains a leader in the application of the 
Frye “general acceptance” rule, in which the court’s fo-
cus is on whether the novel methodologies, hypotheses, 
or theories are sufficiently accepted within the scien-
tific community to be admissible in court.46   
(8) In Pennsylvania, courts employ a Frye analysis 
whenever expert testimony is held to be novel or con-
troversial, or when there is a genuine question as to 
whether the expert is applying the methodology, at is-
sue, in a conventional manner.47   
(9) Converse to the Iowa rule, Utah enacted Utah Rule 
of Evidence 702, which, unlike Iowa Rule of Evidence 
702, does not mirror or adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 
702, and does not require expert testimony to be relia-
ble, based on sufficient quantifiable facts, research, or 
data, nor to have been applied to the specific facts of 
the case at issue; instead, Utah’s standard in permitting 
exert testimony embodies a Frye-like analysis by hold-
ing general acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community to be synonymous with the satisfaction of 
the three preceding considerations and their application 
to the specific facts of the case at issue.48 
 
45 State v. Cassidy, 2018 WL 6002926, *6 (N.J. Nov. 13, 2018) (Although standards for 
expert testimony in civil cases are broadened under a Daubert analysis, the court held Frye to 
remain the standard for admissibility in all criminal proceedings); In re Accutane Litig., 234 
N.J. 340, 397-98 (2018) (applying the factors enumerated in Daubert for civil proceedings but 
reiterating the court’s reluctance to broaden the standard to the context of criminal cases); N.J. 
R. EVID. 702. 
46 Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realty, LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 762, 762 (2014) (holding “the partic-
ular procedure need not be unanimously indorsed by scientists rather than generally acceptable 
as reliable”). 
47 Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 53, 58 (Pa. 2012); PA. R.E. 702; see also Grady 
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1044 (Pa. 2003) (When Frye is inapplicable, a proponent is 
only required to demonstrate that the witness has “a reasonable pretension to specialized 
knowledge of the subject at issue.”)  Id. at 52. 
48 UTAH R. EVID. 702 and Advisory Committee Notes; see also Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson 
v. Davis Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 242 P.3d 762, 766 (Utah 2010).  See generally for a continuously 
updated state-by-state overview of the standards governing the admissibility of expert witness 
testimony at trial, and more specifically, whether a jurisdiction applies the Frye standard, Fed-
eral standard, Daubert standard, or its own unique ruling in allowing expert witness testimony, 
9
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B.  The Federal Rules of Evidence 702: Easing the 
Burden that is “General Acceptance” 
The strict standard established in Frye governed the admission 
of scientific, or otherwise specialized, expert witness testimony for 
fifty years following its promulgation, until the enactment of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence in 1975.49  Specifically, Federal Rule 702,  Tes-
timony by Expert Witnesses, superseded the previously applied Frye 
standard, replacing its authority within federal court.50  The unyielding 
and unequivocal “general acceptance” approach was replaced by a 
broadened, malleable standard, allowing for the introduction of novel 
or contested scientific methodologies and opinions.51  The federal rule 
outlines the necessary elements to be satisfied in order for an expert 
witness to testify in federal court.  Federal Rule 702 reads as follows: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 
to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based 
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the prod-
uct of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the ex-
pert has reliably applied the principles and methods to 
the facts of the case.52 
In general, the purpose of the rule “. . . is simply to ensure that 
a fact-finder is presented with reliable and relevant evidence, not flaw-
less evidence.”53  Accordingly, Rule 702(d) must be analyzed with 
 
see Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w-
017-6355. 
49 Standard for Excluding Expert Testimony: 50 State Survey, Practical Law Checklist w-
017-6355. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  See also Joseph A. Spadaro, An Elusive Search for the Truth: The Admissibility of 
Repressed and Recovered Memories in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 30 CONN. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (1998) (discussing Daubert’s replacement of the Frye 
standard in federal court, “[t]he opinion in Daubert was unanimous. The Frye test, as a stand-
ard for resolving federal admissibility questions, was held to be inappropriate.  Because Frye’s 
general acceptance test could not be found in either the language or the legislative history of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Court held that this test does not survive Rule 702’s enact-
ment.”). 
52 FED. R. EVID. 702 (2019). 
53 State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 945 A.2d 1, 10 (2008). 
10
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some degree of flexibility. This is necessary to encompass the multi-
tude of circumstances and situations that may reasonably and foresee-
ably be presented, and to preserve the distinct relationship between the 
jury as the fact-finder and the judge as the “gatekeeper.” The judge 
holds the crucial obligation of safeguarding the validity and relevance 
of evidence offered to the jury.54  Inevitably, as scientific research 
evolved, the standards for its admission in court broadened, creating a 
shade of gray in an area that was once unambiguous and indisputable.  
This was first illustrated by the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 
702, Testimony by Expert Witnesses, and further outlined by the 
United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.55  
Daubert crafted numerous factors to aid the trial court in determining 
the validity of scientific testimony and established criteria by which 
the trial court may fulfill its role as a “gatekeeper” in the admission of 
expert testimony based on a novel scientific methodology or theory.56 
C.  Daubert: Constructing Factors to Determine the 
Legitimacy of Expert Witness Testimony Based 
upon Controversial or Novel Scientific Evidence 
While the legal system ordinarily does not assess the pace of 
evolving scientific standards in substance or practice, the holdings in 
Daubert make the admission of novel or controversial scientific theo-
ries more probable.57  The factors promulgated in the Daubert decision 
reflect a deliberate response to rapidly expanding scientific methods; 
however, the broadened parameters of the standard allow for a wide 
array of judicial discretion.58  The Supreme Court rejected the concept 
of a strict test for courts to apply in determining the admissibility of 
proffered expert witness testimony, under Federal Rule of Evidence 
 
54 Id. 
55 FED. R. EVID. 702 (2019); C.f., supra note 26, citing the Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
56 Daubert, 509 U.S at 597 (holding that “general acceptance” is no longer a precondition 
to admission of scientific based expert testimony at trial and recognizing “. . . in practice, a 
gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the 
jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations.  That, nevertheless, is the balance 
that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic under-
standing but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”)  Id. 
57 Joseph A. Spadaro, An Elusive Search for the Truth: The Admissibility of Repressed and 
Recovered Memories in Light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 30 CONN. L. 
REV. 1147, 1153 (1998). 
58 Id. 
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702, and instead established a flexible standard completely converse 
to the prior Frye “general acceptance” rule.59  The factors promulgated 
by the Supreme Court in Daubert include: (1) whether the expert has 
a theory and methodology that has the ability to be tested, and if it has 
in fact been tested; (2) whether the expert has a theory and methodol-
ogy that has been the subject of research, peer-review, case study, and 
publication; (3)  the recognized or prospective error rates for a specific 
technique; (4) any principles and controls appropriate to the science; 
and (5) the level of acceptance in the pertinent scientific community.60 
Though post-Daubert evidentiary standards have equated the 
case with the aforementioned factors,61 the Court expressed a reluc-
tance to enumerate any indisputable standard in reviewing the validity 
of scientific-based expert witness testimony.62  In a majority decision 
delivered by Justice Blackmun, the Court urged against any strict 
standard of review when determining the admissibility of novel or con-
troversial scientific evidence: 
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, 
then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pur-
suant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to 
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the 
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.  
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the 
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in is-
sue.  We are confident that federal judges possess the 
capacity to undertake this review.  Many factors will 
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a 
definitive checklist or test.  But some general observa-
tions are appropriate.63 
 
59 Id. 
60 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95. 
61 In determining whether a distinction between “scientific” and “technical” expert witness 
testimony is necessary in the application of Daubert, the Supreme Court of the United States, 
in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, held that “Daubert’s general principles apply to the 
expert matters described in Rule 702. The Rule, in respect to all such matters, “establishes a 
standard of evidentiary reliability.”  Id. at 149. 
62 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. 
63 Id. (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) for authority, “the court must decide any pre-
liminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is ad-
missible.  In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”). 
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35 [2019], No. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/6
2020 ADMISSIBILITY OF RECOVERED MEMORIES 1207 
The Court in Daubert articulated a trust that the trial court will 
ensure the relevance and reliability of scientific based expert witness 
testimony.  Nonetheless, the inherent complexity at the foundation of 
novel scientific testimony results in a heightened probability of con-
fusing the jury.64  Additionally, the flexibility of Daubert provides for 
extensive inconsistency in hired expert witnesses testifying to the va-
lidity of some novel scientific theory or methodology.65  The combi-
nation of Daubert’s malleability and the shifting nature of novel sci-
entific-testimony constructs an environment where expert witness 
testimony can be founded upon pseudoscience lacking the sufficient 
level of support with the appropriate relevant scientific community or 
degree of quantifiable facts to be permissible in judicial proceedings.66 
The essence of this evidentiary standard, applied when decid-
ing the admissibility of novel or controversial scientific evidence, re-
flects the necessity of peer-review among the relevant specified 
 
64 Sofia Adrogue, The Post-Daubert Court - “Amateur Scientist” Gatekeeper or Execu-
tioner?, HOUS. LAW., Mar-Apr 1998, at 10. 
65 See Pullins v. Stihl Inc., No. 03-5343, 2006 WL 1390586, at *3, *5 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 
2006) (involving a product liability case where the plaintiff alleged a deficiency in a machine 
to cut flooring failed to shut off accurately, which resulted in the plaintiff’s leg injury.  Id, at 
*1.  The expert witness for the plaintiff constructed and videotaped two distinguishable exam-
inations encompassing approximately twenty minutes that corroborated the plaintiff’s product 
liability allegations.  Id. at *3.  The first examination consisted of observing the machine 
“when strapped between two desk chairs in the plaintiff’s counsel’s conference room.”  Id.  
The following examination consisted of “observing the machine when placed on a cord in the 
expert’s driveway.”  Id.  The expert, who constructed the entire project, testified that he could 
not recall the model (the machine was available in a variety of models)the plaintiff maneu-
vered and furthermore, caused the plaintiff’s alleged injury, or explain the various details of 
his expert testing and standards.  Id. at *3.  The court held that the expert’s methods and 
resulting conclusions “can only be described as exactly the kind of ‘junk science’ that Daub-
ert sought to purge from the federal courts.”  Id.  The court, entrusted with the duty of being 
the “gatekeeper,” disallowed the expert’s aforementioned faulty testimony, as well as that of 
another expert who based his findings solely on the same unreliable tests.  Id. at *4-5;  
See also supra, note 21 (referring to the holding in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 
(5th Cir. 1997), “the Fifth Circuit reviewed other circuit opinions as to whether Daubert is 
limited to novel scientific techniques or mythologies, and agreeing with the rationale em-
ployed by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits,  found the Daubert ‘criteria equally applicable to 
technical,  or other specialized knowledge.’ According to the Fifth Circuit, ‘whether the expert 
would opine on economic valuation, advertising psychology, or engineering, application of 
the Daubert factors is germane to evaluating whether the expert is a hired gun or a person 
whose opinion in the courtroom will withstand the same scrutiny that it would among his 
professional peers.’”).  Id. 
66 King, 733 S.E.2d at 536 (arguing against the broadened standard of admissibility under 
Daubert, “Daubert was ostensibly to assist with the ongoing controversy over “junk science,” 
“hired gun experts,” etc.  The opinion, however, arguably contains few bright line tests that 
most experts pass.  On the other hand, it does include plenty of quotable language to support 
almost any position.). 
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scientific community when analyzing complex scientific theories and 
methodologies.67  However, it is crucial to note that scientific-based 
testimony is not the only evidentiary category that should be subject to 
rigorous standards of review to ensure reliability, relevance, and cred-
ibility.68  Even the most simple human perceptions can be deceptive 
and complexed. 
III. THE INHERENT FAULTS OF THE HUMAN MIND’S ABILITY TO 
PROCESS EVENTS & THE RESULTING EFFECT ON THE 
RELIABILITY OF PERCEPTION, CONSTRUCTION & FALLACIES 
Dr. Elizabeth Loftus is considered an expert in the study of hu-
man memories and famous for her research in the 1970s and 1980s, 
which analyzed the reliability of eyewitness testimony.69  The research 
Dr. Loftus conducted on human memory and its distortion assessed the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony in response to a constructed simu-
lation of a crime scene or accident by exposing the participants to mis-
information.  The studies included leading questions or accounts of the 
event by media outlets to determine whether the additional stimulus 
affected the participants’ ability to accurately recall the fabricated 
event.70  Dr. Loftus described the process of the human memory as: 
Involving the construction or reconstruction of experi-
ences where a person may blend later occurring details 
 
67 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (holding peer review to be a “pertinent consideration,” stating 
that some theories are “too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published.  But 
submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of ‘good science,’ in 
part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be de-
tected.”  
68 Kern, supra note 35. 
69 Dr. Elizabeth Loftus is a distinguished professor specializing in cognitive psychology, 
human memory, psychology and law.  She received her Ph.D. from Stanford University, and 
currently teaches at UC Irvine.  Anne March & Greta Lorge, How the Truth Gets Twisted: 
Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus Has Devoted Her Career to Proving that Memories Don’t Just 
Fade, They Can Also Change. STANFORD MAGAZINE. (2012), https://web-
files.uci.edu/eloftus/Marsh_TwistedTruth_Loftus_StanfordMagNov -
*+Dec2012.PDF?uniq=jd430q. 
70 Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 1262 (discussing the continued research conducted by Dr. Loftus 
in the 1990s: 
“She further elaborated that her research in the 1990’s expanded the theories of misinformation 
to see whether people could be implanted with entirely false memories, for example, by mak-
ing a person think that he or she had been lost in a shopping mall as a child.  She explained 
that one quarter of the persons involved in this experiment believed in the false memory of 
being lost.”). 
14
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into the memory of an event.  She explained that many 
things could affect the accuracy of a memory, including 
factors related to the perception of an event as it occurs, 
such as lighting and distance and the exposure to post 
event information such as leading questions or media 
coverage, which can distort or supplement a memory.  
Dr. Loftus also explained that the passage of time made 
memories weaker and thus more vulnerable to post 
event contamination.  She explained that a false 
memory is a false belief accompanied by sensory de-
tail.71 
Additionally, Dr. Loftus has testified that it is “virtually impos-
sible without independent corroboration” to distinguish an accurate 
memory from a false memory.72  This illustrates two predominant con-
cerns in allowing expert testimony supporting the validity of false 
memories.   First, the inability to definitively, or even presumptively, 
determine whether or not a memory is truthful or deceptive and second, 
how an individual can sincerely believe that a false memory is an ac-
curate recollection to a perceived event.73 
In order to properly analyze the faults innate to the human 
mind’s process of perceiving and constructing memories, it is essential 
to recognize that the human memory can be broken down into four 
distinct stages: encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval.74  
Memory repression or dissociative amnesia is a wholly distinct cogni-
tive process, completely removed from the mind’s habitual cognitive 
process.75  The process of repressing a once conscious memory alleg-
edly involves “the forcing of ideas, perceptions or memories associated 
 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See J. Douglas Bremner et al., Neural Mechanisms in Dissociative Amnesia for Child-
hood Abuse: Relevance to the Current Controversy Surrounding the “False Memory Syn-
drome,” 153 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 71, 72 (1996). 
75 See Linda M. Williams, What Does it Mean to Forget Child Sexual Abuse? A Reply to 
Loftus, Garry, and Feldman, 62 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1182, 1183 (1994) 
(“Memories of sexual abuse may be encoded, stored, and retrieved differently from other 
memories, especially when the abuse occurs under circumstances of high arousal, terror, ex-
treme ambivalence, where escape is impossible, or when the meaning of the abuse could be 
devastating if confronted.”). 
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with psychic trauma from conscious awareness into the uncon-
scious.”76 
A.  Understanding the Phenomenon Known as 
Repressed Memory Syndrome or Dissociative 
Amnesia 
Given the nature of the evidence often derived from a repressed 
memory,77 it is fitting that Sigmund Freud proposed the first docu-
mented theory attempting to rationalize the enigmatic cognitive pro-
cess that is dissociative amnesia.78  Freud theorized that an individual 
represses the memory of an event as a “defense mechanism that serves 
to repudiate or suppress emotions, needs, feelings or intentions in order 
to prevent psychic pain.”79  Moreover, Freud argued that the human 
mind’s process of repressing a traumatic event from the individual’s 
apparent consciousness is comparable to a “layer by layer excavation 
of a buried city, that should proceed slowly.”80  The American Psychi-
atric Association (hereinafter “APA”) first recognized the cognitive 
process underlying repressed memory syndrome by the medical term, 
 
76 Stan Abrams, False Memory Syndrome v. Total Repression, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 283, 
283 (1995); See also Doe v. Roe, 955 F.2d, See Shanley, 919 N.E.2d at 957 (defining repressed 
memory or dissociative amnesia as “a psychological defense mechanism that protects the in-
dividual from being confronted with the memory of an event that is too traumatic to cope 
with”); Bremner et al., at 71-72 (“In dissociative amnesia, which can be associated with ex-
posure to psychological trauma, information is not available to conscious awareness for an 
extended period of time, although it may have an influence on behavior.”).  See also Laura 
Johnson, Litigating Nightmares: Repressed Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 51 S.C. L. 
REV. 939, 942 (2000). 
77 R. Joseph, The Neurology of Traumatic “Dissociative” Amnesia: Commentary and Lit-
erature Review, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 715, 721 (1999) (While Joseph noted that most 
cases of dissociative amnesia occur in cases involving child sexual abuse, he nevertheless em-
phasized the importance in acknowledging that “[t]raumatic dissociative amnesia, however, is 
not limited to children, but includes, “hardened soldiers,” as well as, presumably, normal 
adults.”). 
78 Elizabeth Loftus & Katherine Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory: False Memo-
ries and Allegations of Sexual Abuse, 50 (1996). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 51.  However, Freud later rejected this detailed theory about repression, instead, 
arguing that dissociative amnesia involved “sexual fantasies that engaged adult hysteria” and 
other scientists and researchers produced studies that “support Freud’s originally hypothesized 
connection between child sexual abuse, no recall of the abuse, and high levels of psychological 
symptoms in adulthood, at least in clinical samples.”  See Linda M. Williams, Recall of Child-
hood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women’s Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J. OF 
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1167, 1168 (1994). 
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dissociative amnesia in the fourth edition of The Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders,  published in 1994: 
The essential feature of Dissociate Amnesia is an ina-
bility to recall important personal information, usually 
of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too extensive 
to be explained by normal forgetfulness. . . This disor-
der involves a reversible memory impairment in which 
memories of personal experience cannot be retrieved in 
a verbal form (or, if temporarily retrieved, cannot be 
wholly retained in consciousness. . .)81 
The controversy surrounding dissociative amnesia mostly in-
volves cases concerning memories of later recalled childhood sexual 
abuse.82  Although experts in the field of psychiatry have agreed that 
the trauma inflicted by childhood sexual abuse may relate to the human 
mind’s ability to repress the memory of this traumatic event, these 
same experts debate the reliability of such memories in the context of 
legal proceedings.83   
B.  Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome or Child Sexual 
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome 
Repressed memories are most frequently the products of sexual 
abuse occurring at a young age.84  Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome or 
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome was developed in the 
mid-1980s to explain the behaviors of child sexual abuse victims.85  
Initially introduced as a “theoretical model” in 1982, Child Sexual 
Abuse Syndrome consisted of five behavioral phases observed in chil-
dren who have been the victim of sexual abuse:  (1) non-sexual en-
gagement by the offender; (2) sexual activity occurs; (3) the offender 
uses rewards or threats to keep the child quiet; (4) disclosure by the 
 
81 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 478 (4th ed. 1994). 
82 Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution 
About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 129, 135 (1993) (In acknowledging the correlation between childhood sexual 
abuse and dissociative amnesia, Loftus and Ernsdorff concluded that: “it is widely accepted 
by clinicians that the particulars of the trauma are especially conducive to repression of 
memory of the incident.”). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Max R. Selver, Sex Abuse Validation Testimony: Ripe for A Frye Challenge, 41 
HARBINGER 287, 288 (2017). 
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child; and (5) suppression by the child.86  The following year, Child 
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome was introduced to detail the 
same behavioral patterns in abused children.  This also consisted of 
five phases: “(1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accom-
modation; (4) delayed, conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and 
(5) retraction.”87  Critically, the psychiatrists who developed these be-
havioral concepts cautioned that they are not to be used as “diagnostic 
tools.”  Moreover, both theoretical models are not to be used as uni-
form determinates as to whether a child was the victim of sexual 
abuse.88  Converse to the abovementioned warnings, the factors enun-
ciated by both psychological theories were broadly applied leading to 
erroneous and troubling allegations of child sexual abuse.89 
The application and prominence of Child Sexual Abuse Syn-
drome (hereinafter “CSAS”) or Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 
Syndrome (hereinafter “CSAAS”) reached its peak in the late 1980s 
through the early 1990s, amidst what is presently considered “the sa-
tanic panic:”  a period of sensationalized nationwide hysteria that dom-
inated American news and media outlets.90  In 1988, New Jersey chil-
dren’s daycare teacher, Margaret Kelly Michaels, was falsely 
convicted of 115 counts of sexual abuse committed against a child on 
twenty of her students,  none of which she committed.91  Michaels was 
sentenced to forty-seven years in prison.92   
 
86 Dr. Suzanne Sgroi introduced this concept in 1982 in her book, Handbook of Clinical 
Intervention in Child Sexual Abuse.  Id. 
87 Dr. Rowland Summit introduced this analogous theory in 1983 in his article The Child 
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 181 (1983).  Id. 
88 See Avi Springer & Patrick Clark, Challenging Validation Testimony Through Frye 
Hearings (2015) (detailing how Dr. Summit and Dr. Sgroi “qualified their theories in im-
portant ways”); Suzanne M. Sgroi, Handbook of Clinical Intervention in Child Sexual Abuse 
12-36, at 78 (1982) (“Behavioral indicators of child sexual abuse may be helpful but are rarely 
conclusive.”); Mary Meinig, Profile on Roland Summit, 1 VIOLENCE UPDATE 6, 6 (1991) (“The 
accommodation syndrome is neither an illness or a diagnosis, and it can’t be used to measure 
whether or not a child has been sexually abused.”). 
89 Selver, supra note 85. 
90 See Sarah Hughes, American Monsters: Tabloid Media and the Satanic Panic, 1970–
2000, 51 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES 691, 691–719 (2017); Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid 
Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 519, 520 (2000)  
(“The parental panic has its recent origins in the early 1980s, when a wave of child molestation 
cases raised public awareness and gripped the country”); See generally Bette L. Bottoms and 
Suzanne L. Davis, The Creation of Satanic Ritual Abuse, 16 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND CLINICAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 2, 112-32, https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.1997.16.2.112 (1997). 
91 Selver, supra note 85. 
92 Id. 
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An in-depth article about the trial in Harper’s Magazine 
explained that “[p]erhaps the most important witness 
for the prosecution” was a psychologist, acting as vali-
dator, who testified that each of the twenty children suf-
fered from CSAAS. This testimony was offered as 
proof that Ms. Kelly Michaels sexually abused them. 
According to the psychologist, children who repeatedly 
denied abuse were in Dr. Sgroi’s “suppression phase,” 
and children who showed affection toward Ms. Kelly 
Michaels were in Dr. Sgroi’s “engagement phase.”93 
The malleability of the five phases indicative of CAAS or 
CSAAS constructs a broad application with the ability to conform to 
the behavior of nearly any child.94  The supporting expert witness tes-
timony convicting Michaels illustrates this flexibility.95  More im-
portantly, it demonstrates the overall weight and power of expert wit-
ness testimony in a trial concerning child sexual abuse.96  Specifically, 
the supporting expert testimony worked to verify accusations that can 
only be described as extraordinary, including allegations that 
Michaels: “raped [the] children with silverware, wooden spoons, 
Legos and light bulbs, that she played ‘Jingle Bells’ on the piano while 
naked, taken [sic] their temperature rectally and forced them to eat ex-
crement off the floor.”97 
Margaret Kelly Michaels’ conviction was overruled in 1992 by 
a New Jersey State appellate court.98  The court justified its ruling by 
the state’s improper use of expert testimony as validation and substan-
tive evidence against Michaels to prove that the children involved 
were, in fact, victims of sexual abuse.99  The children’s disturbing 
claims, described earlier as “extraordinary,” were falsely verified by 
 
93 Id. at 288-89. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 519, 521 (2000); See also Nancy Haas, Margaret Kelly Michaels Wants Her 
Innocence Back, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 37; Elliot Pinsley, Wee-Care 
Teacher Asks for Mistrial over Hearsay Evidence, Record (N.J), Feb. 12, 1988, at A3. 
98 State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 496 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d, 642 A.2d 1372 (1994) 
(citing John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. 
REV. 1, 67–68 (1989) (“the proper use of child-abuse expert testimony is as a rehabilitative 
tool and not as a diagnostic investigative device, as ‘[t]he syndrome does not detect sexual 
abuse.’”).  State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 594. 
99 Id. 
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the use of expert testimony.100  Unfortunately,  this case was not unique 
and was merely one of the many cases that involved improper convic-
tions based on false claims of child sexual abuse, further demonstrating 
the “satanic panic” hysteria which characterized the late eighties pro-
ceeding into the early nineties.101  Notably, this included an “investi-
gation in Wenatchee, Washington, in which forty-three adults were ar-
rested on more than twenty-nine thousand charges of sex abuse 
involving sixty-eight children” and the unsettling number of wrongful 
convictions, later overturned, which laid in the wake of the national 
media craze.102   
 
100 The Court in State v. Michaels, discussed the troubles facing the scientific community, 
specifically in regard to professionals within the psychiatric community asked to testify in 
criminal child sexual abuse cases.  Id. at 500.  The court notes opinions within the psychiatric 
community that convey the belief that therapists, psychologists, and other mental health pro-
fessionals should not disclose their belief as to whether the alleged abuse in fact occurred, 
arguing that absolute determinations of guilt are out of the realm of psychological opinion.  Id; 
Marian D. Hall, The Role of Psychologists As Experts in Cases Involving Allegations of Child 
Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 451, 462 (1989) (explaining the troubles facing the scientific 
community with regards to expert testimony in cases involving allegations of child sexual 
abuse: 
“[i]t would appear that the prospect of designing checklists, inventories, and rating-scales to 
provide objective measures of abusive behavior, its antecedents, correlates, and consequences, 
holds promise of yielding information that may be useful both in individual and epidemiolog-
ical data gathering.  Designing and validating such measures, however, depends on theory and 
research that is currently the focus of much study and controversy.  Nowhere is that more 
evident than in the scientific and legal arguments about whether behaviors exist that are unique 
to sexually abused children and whether such behaviors fall into patterns that suggest a typical 
’profile’” or ’syndrome’ for the child sexual abuse victim.  Children’s reactions to sexual abuse 
vary dramatically and, to date, the methodological problems involved in compiling results of 
the scores of diverse studies have led only to lists of very general symptoms, which occur to 
some extent in all children, and are especially prevalent in children who suffer from various 
forms of emotional trauma, separation, or loss of security.”).  Id. 
101 Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000 
WIS. L. REV. 519, 522 (2000).   
“The constant media attention was crucial to how the cases were perceived by the public and 
professionals.  These highly publicized cases raised public awareness about child sex-abuse 
and, more generally, the child care industry.  In response to the wave of reported child abuse 
incidents, numerous nonprofit organizations stepped up child abuse education and prevention 
programs and national attention was focused on the need for quality, affordable child care.  
But raising public awareness through unrelenting news coverage of notorious crimes also 
alarms viewers and raises irrational fears.  Projecting fears onto parents was done in an overt 
fashion at times.  For example, a 1984 article in the Washington Post warned that “[t]he Cali-
fornia child-molesting story has got to chill the heart of every parent who has left a child with 
a babysitter or put a child in a day-care center.”  Id. 
102 See Lynn Sweet, On a Quest for Vindication, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 1999, at 30 (de-
tailing the false sexual molestation allegations made against the owner of Kids Stop and 
Mother Goose day care center located in the suburbs of Chicago by four young girls under her 
care in 1997).  An analogous situation occurred in Maryland where thirteen children falsely 
20
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More recently, in 2011, the Court of Appeals of New York, in 
People v. Spicola, upheld a licensed clinical social worker’s testimony 
relating to CSAAS being offered to “rehabilitate the complainant’s 
credibility” who did not report the abuse until several years following 
the alleged acts.103  Nonetheless, the social worker emphasized that 
CSAAS, in spite of its name, was not a diagnosis; instead, “it describes 
a range of behaviors observed in cases of validated child sexual 
abuse.”104  The expert stressed that the existence or nonexistence of a 
particular behavior is not substantive evidence that the complainant 
was the victim of sexual abuse.105  Furthermore, the social worker was 
not apprised of any of the facts of the case and testified objectively to 
the characteristics accompanying CSAAS.106  Notably, the court in 
Spicola sustained the scientific validity of CSAAS, at least for the pur-
pose for which it was offered and the defense failed to question “the 
empirical basis for delayed reporting.”107  Instead, the defense criti-
cized the frequency of denial and recantation in cases involving 
CSAAS, aspects the Court of Appeals of New York held to be not at 
issue in the present case.108  However, denial, recantation and changes 
or fabrications in recollections are common in cases involving any 
early memory, especially those involving traumatic events.109 
 
accused daycare workers of sexual abuse. See Steve Crane, Woman Maintains Innocence in 
Preschoolers’ Abuse Case, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 1989, at B1; Richard Beck, We Believe The 
Children, xxii (2015)  (“Eighteen of the accused, nearly all of whom were poor and on welfare 
and some of whom were illiterate or mentally handicapped, were convicted in the mid-1990s.)  
Id.  The last of them was not released from prison until 2000. Id. City and county officials 
were found negligent in their conduct of the investigation in a civil lawsuit in 2001”); See 
Mike Barber & Larry Lange,  Jury Finds City, County Negligent in Child Sex Ring 
Case, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (July 31, 2001), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/arti-
cle/Jury-finds-city-county-negligent-in-child-sex-1061384.php [https://perma.cc/Y87N-
4RB7]. 
103 In People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 442, 947 N.E.2d 620 (2011), the defense attacked 
the complainant’s credibility “principally on the basis that he neglected to report the alleged 
abuse promptly and continued to associate with defendant after the abuse was claimed to have 
taken place.  The legitimate purpose of the expert’s testimony was to counter defendant’s in-
ference that the complainant’s behavior was inconsistent with having been molested.”  Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 “Although, as a whole, the expert’s testimony certainly supported the complainant’s 
credibility by supplying explanations other than fabrication for his post-molestation behavior, 
the expert did not express an opinion on the complainant’s credibility.”  Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Consider Elizabeth Loftus’s famous 1995 “lost in the mall” study in which participants 
were told that they were lost in a shopping mall as a child and many of the individuals would 
falsely “remember” the traumatic event and some even fabricated the experience.  Gary M. 
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The reappearance and validation of CSAAS illustrate the dan-
gers ignited by the “satanic panic” period of media hysteria in the 
United States, foreshadowing the possible consequences in permitting 
expert witness testimony to validate criminal accusations not grounded 
within a proper scientific method.  Furthermore, the cases which en-
compass this phase of media-induced fear and paranoia demonstrate 
the often-inconsistent nature of scientific opinions and the harmful 
consequences which follow the hasty application of contested psychi-
atric theories.110    
C.  Wavering Opinions Regarding the Validity of 
Recovered Repressed Memories Within the 
Relevant Scientific Community 
The debate relating to recovered repressed memories or disso-
ciative amnesia has enthralled the psychiatric community for dec-
ades.111  In 1997, two professionals in the field of memory research 
noted that “the recovered memories debate is the most passionately 
contested battle [ever] waged about the nature of human memory,” and 
psychiatric professionals involved in the debate found “their compe-
tence, motives, and even integrity called into question.”112 The discus-
sion has consistently been characterized by “strong emotions and often 
by outright acrimony” even among professionals.113  These strong 
emotions were first made apparent by the inability of six experts in the 
field of psychiatry (three clinicians and three researchers) to agree on 
the validity of the phenomenon.114  The American Psychological 
 
Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling 
the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 
135 (1993). 
110 See Gerstein v. Senkowski, 426 F.3d 588, 600 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting a leading psy-
chologist for the conclusion that “the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome . . . has no 
validity and is not regularly accepted in the scientific community”); See also Jill Birnbaum, 
NAT’L CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, INC., Expert Testimony in Custody and Visitation 
Cases Involving Child Sexual Abuse 699 (1990) (“Unlike some other syndromes, such as bat-
tered women’s syndrome or rape victim’s syndrome, the child sexual abuse accommodation 
syndrome was not created as a diagnostic tool, and children who display signs of the syndrome 
may not have been abused.”). 
111 Id. 
112 August Piper et. al., What’s Wrong with Believing in Repression? A Review for Legal 
Professionals, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 223, 230 (2008). 
113 Id. 
114 This group included experts across the field of psychiatry who continued to publish dif-
fering opinions regarding the phenomenon known as dissociative amnesia or recovered 
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Association assembled the group in 1993 with the task of reviewing 
“the scientific literature on adults’ previously unrecalled memories of 
childhood sex abuse, and to make recommendations to the Association 
to inform future discourse.”115  Unfortunately, this task proved to be 
quite difficult, and the group of professionals was unable to reach a 
uniform consensus, failing to publish the report for which it was em-
ployed.116  Instead, the clinicians published their findings, as the re-
searchers too published their differing conclusions, and each even pub-
lished specific replies to the other’s publications.117  Seven leading 
scientific journals further illustrate the skepticism surrounding re-
pressed memories and dissociative amnesia:118 
The American Medical Association considers recov-
ered memories of childhood sexual abuse to be of un-
certain authenticity, which should be subject to external 
verification. The use of recovered memories is fraught 
with problems of potential misapplication (American 
Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs, 
1995, p. 117). If memories of events have not been re-
visited and cognitively rehearsed in the interval be-
tween occurrence of the events and attention being paid 
to them some years later, it is not clear that such mem-
ories can endure, be accessible, or be reliable (Canadian 
Psychiatric Association, 1996, p. 305). Existing scien-
tific evidence does not allow global statements to be 
made about a definite relationship between trauma and 
memory. The available scientific and clinical evidence 
does not allow accurate, inaccurate, and fabricated 
memories to be distinguished [from one another] in the 
 
repressed memories: E. F. Loftus, P. A. Ornstein, C.A. Courtois, S.J. Ceci, L.S. Brown, and 
J.L. Alpert.  Id.  See generally P.A. Ornstein, S. J. Ceci, & E. F Loftus, Comment on Alpert, 
Brown, and Courtois: The science of memory and the practice of psychotherapy (1998).  
PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW, 4(4), 996-1010 (1998); J. L. Alpert, L. S. Brown, & 
C. A. Courtois, Reply to Ornstein, Ceci, and Loftus (1998): The politics of memory. 
PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND LAW, 4(4), 1011-1024 (1998). 
115 Piper, supra note 112. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 These journals include: the American Psychiatric Association, the American Medical 
Association, the Canadian Psychiatric Association, the Australian Psychological Society, and 
the (British) Royal College of Psychiatrists.  Id. at 230-31. 
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absence of independent corroboration (Australian Psy-
chological Society, Limited, 1994, p. 2).119 
By the late 1990s, merely a quarter of psychiatrists polled 
stated they believed dissociative amnesia is supported by strong scien-
tific evidence.120  Currently, skepticism surrounding the phenomenon 
remains high among the psychiatric community; moreover, the current 
emphasis of the debate focuses on the danger of false and sometimes 
implanted memories, leading to false allegations which the accuser 
wholeheartedly believes to be authentic.121  Notably, current experts in 
the field of psychiatry emphasize the human memory’s inability to 
flawlessly recall past events, recognizing memories to be reconstruc-
tive as opposed to reproductive.122  The reconstructive nature of the 
human memory suggests that most individuals have constructed false 
memories, devoid of any conscious intention, as observed by William 
James,123 more than a century ago: 
False memories are by no means rare occurrences in 
most of us . . . Most people probably are in doubt about 
certain matters ascribed to their past. They may have 
seen them, may have said them, done them, or they may 
only have dreamed or imagined they did so.124 
Misconceptions as to the human mind’s ability to accurately 
recall previously perceived events have consequently led to the imple-
mentation of retrieval methods that may be harmful or suggestive.125  
In general, detailed and vivid memories that are emotional in nature 
are easier to recall and more likely to be held with the utmost confi-
dence regardless of the recollection’s accuracy.126  However, memo-
ries naturally become distorted over time as an individual perceives 
 
119 Id. at 230-31. 
120 Id. 
121 S. J. Lynn, J. Evans, J. R Laurence, & S.O. Lilienfeld, What Do People Believe About 
Memory? Implications for the Science and Pseudoscience of Clinical Practice. CANADIAN 
JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRY, 60(12), 541–47 (2015). 
122 Id. 
123 William James (1842-1910) was a psychologist and philosopher who was instrumental 
to the inception of the psychology department at Harvard University. For more information 
about William James see https://psychology.fas.harvard.edu/people/william-james. 
124 Lynn, supra note 121. (citing William James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. 1 
(1890)). 
125 Lynn, supra note 121. 
126 Id. 
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and stores new events into his or her mind’s limited storage space for 
memories: 
Even in cases of emotionally compelling, so-called 
flashbulb memories—memories marked by a seem-
ingly photographic quality—recollections often change 
substantially over time, as documented by studies of the 
catastrophic breakup of the space shuttle Challenger, 
the trial verdict of football star O J Simpson, the death 
of Princess Diana, and the September 11, 2001, attacks. 
Dekel and Bonanno conducted repeated memory as-
sessments of survivors of the September 11th attacks 
who had witnessed them directly, and found considera-
ble variation in memory reports at 7, compared with 18, 
months.127 
Experts in the field of psychiatry note that individuals who 
were “resilient in the face of trauma” construct a more neutral, “be-
nign,” recollection of the event over time, while individuals who report 
suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder have more stable and con-
sistent memories.128  Though psychiatric professionals are unsure of 
the reasoning behind this finding, it is apparent that recollections of 
past events are malleable and memories become distorted as they pass 
through the encoding process129 on to the consolidation and storage 
 
127 Id. (citing U. Neisser & N. Harsch, Phantom Flashbulbs: False Recollections of Hearing 
the News About Challenger, Affect and Accuracy in Recall: Studies of “Flashbulb” Memories, 
EMORY SYMPOSIA IN COGNITION, 9–31 (1992); H. Schmolck, E.A. Buffalo, & L.R. Squire, 
Memory Distortions Develop Over Time: Recollections of the O.J. Simpson Trial Verdict After 
15 and 32 Months, 1 PSYCHOL SCI. 11, 39-45 (2000); E. Krackow, S.J. Lynn, D. Payne, The 
Death of Princess Diana: The Effects of Memory Enhancement Procedures on Flashbulb 
Memories, IMAGIN COGN PERS. 25, 197–220 (2005); W. Hirst & E.A. Phelps, A Ten-year Fol-
low-up of a Study of Memory for the Attack of September 11, 2001: Flashbulb Memories and 
Memories for Flashbulb Events, EXP PSYCHOL GEN. 144(3):604-23 (2015); Dekel S, Bonanno, 
Changes in Trauma Memory and Patterns of Posttraumatic Stress, PSYCHOL TRAUMA. 
2013;5(1):26–34; S.M. Southwick & C.A. Morgan III, Consistency of Memory for Combat-
Related Traumatic Events in Veterans of Operation Desert Storm, AM J PSYCHIATRY (1997)). 
128 Lynn, supra note 121. 
129 The encoding stage is the brain’s process of constructing “memory code” which is nec-
essary to store information perceived from an event into a memory.  Ruth Lee Johnson, J.D., 
How Does the Law Treat Repressed Memories?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 09, 2016, 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/so-sue-me/201602/how-does-the-law-treat-re-
pressed-memories. 
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stages130 before a memory is retrieved.131  A study involving U.S. vet-
erans of the Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm observed that nearly 
ninety-percent of the veterans recalled different memories when ques-
tioned about the same traumatic experience after merely two years 
from the perceived event.132  As indicated by laboratory research, an 
individual may correspondingly recall an event to be more traumatic, 
bearing more emotion and disturbance with the passage of time.133  A 
study performed by experts from John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
reported that its participants mistakenly claimed to have witnessed 
twenty-six percent of the brief clips omitted from an unsettling film 
depicting a gruesome car accident that displayed the deaths of five 
adults and an infant.134  The study’s participants were particularly 
prone to falsely recall, with the sincerest confidence, the most trau-
matic and gruesome portions of the film.135 
The malleability and impressionable nature of a memory is il-
lustrated by the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, even when the 
witness testifies with certainty and confidence.  Moreover, suggestive 
techniques used during psychotherapy can falsely implant memories 
of complex occurrences.136  Consequently, individuals have falsely re-
called events involving being the victim of one or more bullies, com-
mitting one or more criminal acts, riding a hot-air balloon, and being 
the victim of a serious animal attack.137  An individual’s specificity in 
recalling an event and the emotion he or she attaches to the memory 
has no bearing on its validity.138  Fallacies can occur during any of the 
mind’s numerous processes in creating, storing, and retrieving 
 
130 The consolidation and storages stages are the brain’s process of maintaining the above-
mentioned “memory code” over time.  Id. 
131 The retrieval stage is the process of recovering stored memories.  Id. 
132  Lynn, supra note 121.  The group of veterans were questioned about the same traumatic 
experience, one month after its occurrence.  Id.  The same group of veterans were then ques-
tioned about the same occurrence two years later.  Id.  It was then observed that 88% of the 
veterans recalled the same event differently.  Id. 
133 D. Strange & M.K. Takarangi, False Memories for Missing Aspects of Traumatic Events, 
ACTA PSYCHOL (AMST). 141(3):322-6 (2012). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Johnson, supra note 129. 
137 M. Garry & K.A. Wade, Actually, a Picture is Worth Less Than 45 Words: Narratives 
Produce More False Memories than Photographs Do, PSYCHON BULL REV. 2005 Apr; 
12(2):359-66; J. Shaw & S. Porter, Constructing Rich False Memories of Committing Crime, 
PSYCHOL SCI. 2015 Mar; 26(3):291-301. 
138 B.E. Bell, E.F. Loftus, Degree of Detail of Eyewitness Testimony and Mock Juror Judg-
ments. J APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL., 1988;18(14):1171–1192. 
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memories.139  During the encoding stage, an imagined occurrence may 
be constructed as a perceived event, thus creating a false memory.140  
Moreover, studies demonstrate that a lack of sleep may negatively af-
fect memory consolidation and storage.141  Finally, at the retrieval 
stage, memories may be falsely recalled when produced by certain 
tasks or prompts; thus, the retrieval process is especially vulnerable to 
the tactics employed by psychotherapists.142   
The recent scientific observation finding the human memory to 
be constructive bears strong implications for the admission of recov-
ered repressed memories during criminal proceedings; conversely, the 
human mind’s incapacity to subconsciously preserve our memories 
flawlessly, while remaining accessible through therapeutic recovery 
methods, should bear equal consequence.143  The notion of a repressed 
memory found its inception with Sigmund Freud.144  However, modern 
psychotherapeutic methods that aim to recover memories repressed 
from the holder’s own conscious awareness lack the necessary support 
among the psychiatric community to be properly admitted into evi-
dence during a criminal proceeding, even when analyzed under the 
more flexible Daubert standard.145   
D.  The Vague, Elusive, and Constructive Nature of 
Memory as Illustrated During Brett Kavanaugh’s 
Confirmation to the United States Supreme Court 
Memories are not impeccable because the mind does not func-
tion as a video camera, recording each detail of an event and searing it 
into an accurate and detailed memory of an event.146  Generally, hu-
mans as a whole are “best adapted for accumulating knowledge for 
 
139 Johnson, supra note 129. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Lynn, supra note 121. 
144 March, supra note 69. 
145 As discussed, the standards for the admission of expert witness testimony into evidence, 
during a criminal proceeding, are as follows: (1) whether the expert has a theory and method-
ology that has the ability to be tested, and if it has in fact been tested; (2) whether the expert 
has a theory and methodology that has been the subject of research, peer-review, case study, 
and publication; (3) the recognized or prospective error rates for a specific technique; (4) any 
principles and controls appropriate to the science; and (5) the level of acceptance in the perti-
nent scientific community.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. 
146 Tom Singer, To Tell The Truth, Memory Isn’t That Good, 63 MONT. L. REV. 337, 359 
(2002). 
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inference, approximation, concept formation, and classification not for 
the literal retention of the individual exemplars that lead to and support 
general knowledge.”147  Consequently, unflawed detailed recall of an 
event in the years that follow is virtually unachievable.  This inherent 
fault was exemplified during Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation 
to the United States Supreme Court in 2018 when Dr. Christine Blasey 
Ford accused Justice Kavanaugh of sexually assaulting her at a party 
when they both were in high school.148  This Note will not attempt to 
substantiate or repudiate Dr. Ford’s allegations; instead, this is an op-
portunity to shed some light on how the memory process functions 
within the context of a relevant national discussion.   
Dr. Ford contended that she was always conscious of the as-
sault, though only beginning to speak openly about it during a couple’s 
therapy session with her husband in 2012.149  In the time that followed, 
Dr. Ford stated that she did her best to “suppress memories of the as-
sault” because recalling the event caused her a great deal of trauma and 
anxiety.150  This is distinguishable from cases involving alleged re-
pressed memories, a form of suppression where an individual subcon-
sciously blocks the memory of an event from his or her conscious re-
call.151  Dr. Ford affirmed that after her initial disclosure in couple’s 
therapy she recalled the event further during individual therapy ses-
sions on a few occasions.152  Dr. Ford publicly disclosed the details of 
this event in July of 2018 following Justice Kavanaugh’s imminent ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court by President Donald Trump.153   
This ignited a parochial uproar in the court of public opinion in 
which the U.S. twenty-four-hour news media cycle divided on partisan 
lines to either unabashedly support or discredit Dr. Ford’s claims.154  
Thus, parties on one end of the political spectrum emphasized Dr. 
Ford’s lack of detail in recalling the assault, citing her inability to 
 
147 Id. 
148 Written Test. Of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, S. Judiciary Comm., 2 (Sept. 26, 2018). 
149 Id. at 4. 
150 Id. 
151 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, supra note 81. 
152 Written Test. Of Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 148. 
153 Id. at 4-5. 
154 Compare Steve Benen, Dr. Ford is ‘100 Percent’ Certain About Her Kavanaugh Alle-
gation, Sept. 27, 2018 http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/dr-ford-100-percent-cer-
tain-about-her-kavanaugh-allegation with Scott A. Johnson, Christine Blasey Ford’s Accusa-
tions Against Brett Kavanaugh: A Case for Discussion, FORENSIC RES. CRIMINAL INT. J. 
2019;7(1):1‒10. DOI:10.15406/frcij.2019.07.00257. 
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recollect the location or owner of the house where the party and sub-
sequent assault transpired155 while those in opposition supported the 
accuracy of Dr. Ford’s accounts on their face.156   
To this end, most fail to note that memories relating to events 
that occurred more than thirty-years prior are ambiguous and shaded 
gray; this does not allow for black and white inferences as to their ac-
curacy.  Distortion in recollection is unavoidable, “memory is distor-
tion since memory is invariably and inevitably selective.  A way of 
seeing is a way of not seeing, a way of remembering is a way of for-
getting, too.”157  If memory were merely a system of recording, “a 
‘true’ memory might be possible.  But memory is a process of encod-
ing information, storing information, and strategically retrieving infor-
mation, and there are social, psychological, and historical influences at 
each point.”158  Any genuine allegation pertaining to an event that 
arose more than thirty-years prior conveys a degree of ambiguity; fur-
thermore, an elaborately detailed recollection of dated events illus-
trates the reconstructive nature of memory.  The truth is, there is no 
way to validate an allegation of sexual assault dating more than thirty-
years absent objective corroborating evidence which unfortunately is 
lost with the passage of time.  Nonetheless, the conscious suppression 
of a memory must be distinguished from the unintentional repression 
of a memory and its consequent retrieval through problematic thera-
peutic methods. 
E.  Contemporary Psychiatric Intervention 
Techniques Employed with the Goal of Retrieving 
Repressed Traumatic Memories 
In order to sufficiently allocate the appropriate degree of cred-
ibility to recovered repressed memories of traumatic events in the con-
text of a criminal proceeding, it is crucial to be aware of the numerous 
techniques employed by psychiatric professionals across the field to 
 
155 Scott A. Johnson, Christine Blasey Ford’s Accusations Against Brett Kavanaugh: A 
Case for Discussion, FORENSIC RES. CRIMINAL INT. J. 2019;7(1):1‒10. 
DOI:10.15406/frcij.2019.07.00257, at 4. 
156 Steve Benen, Dr. Ford is ‘100 Percent’ Certain About Her Kavanaugh Allegation, Sept. 
27, 2018 http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/dr-ford-100-percent-certain-about-
her-kavanaugh-allegation. 
157 Michael Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in Memory Distor-
tion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past 346, 348 (Schacter ed. 1995). 
158 Id. 
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retrieve these so-called memories from an individual’s subconscious 
to his or her conscious awareness.  These methods include titles such 
as alien abduction therapy, somatic experiencing therapy, reenactment 
protocol, neuro-linguistic programming, sensorimotor psychotherapy, 
experiential integration, energy approaches, and internal family sys-
tems therapy, “the last of which involves interaction and work with 
putatively dissociated parts of the personality.”159  Most, if not all, of 
the abovementioned therapies, may be more accurately characterized 
as pseudoscientific because they draw nearly all of their support from 
anecdotal claims, as opposed to the more conventional use of con-
trolled trial studies.160  Furthermore, these therapeutic methods are of-
ten founded upon the false principle that memories are permanent and 
preserved perfectly, and moreover, that memory retrieval is necessary 
for positive therapeutic outcomes.161  None of the abovementioned 
principles presently hold any notable support within the scientific com-
munity.162 
F.  Memory Implantation: How a Third Party or 
External Factors May Construct a False Memory 
Research on the development of a false memory commonly 
combines “suggestive techniques with social pressure”163 to cause par-
ticipants to recall memories that did not, in reality, occur.164  Adult 
research participants are led to believe that the researchers are primar-
ily interested in how individuals recall childhood events.165  Partici-
pants are presented with sets of childhood events containing one false 
event created by the study’s researchers.  Over the course of approxi-
mately one week, participants are encouraged to recall childhood 
events by employing several memory recovery techniques used in 
 
159 Lynn, supra note 121. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Alan Scoboria, Kimberley A. Wade, D. Stephen Lindsay, Tanjeem Azad, Deryn Strange, 
James Ost & Ira E. Hyman, A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false 
memory implantation studies, Memory, 25:2, 146-163, DOI: 
10.1080/09658211.2016.1260747, 4 (2017). 
164 These notable studies include: the “lost-in-the-mall” study (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), the 
“memory implantation methodology” (Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002), and “familial-
informant false narrative” (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004).  Id. 
165 Id. at 5. 
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“trauma-memory-oriented therapy (e.g., guided visualization).”166  Re-
searchers then determine the extent to which they were able to implant 
a false memory in the subject during the final interview process.167  
This method remains the most consistent in the psychiatric study of 
memory implantation and retrieval.168  Sadly, many cases involving 
purported recovered repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse in-
volve a member or multiple members of the complainant’s family in 
some capacity.  Simultaneously, researchers have found that telling 
subjects that a family member provided the information relating to the 
supposed events increased the likeliness that the subject would accept 
the false event as a genuine memory.169   
In 2017, researchers compiled studies on false memory implan-
tation from New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the 
United States to determine the ability to implant a false memory in a 
subject, and additionally, the frequency to which the individual 
acknowledges the false event as an authentic childhood memory.170  
When the findings were analyzed without considering the variations in 
study techniques, it was found that more than thirty percent171 of re-
search participants were categorized as having constructed a false 
memory and more than half172 of the participants were considered to 
have accepted the false suggested event as an authentic childhood 
memory, to some extent.173  Furthermore, when the findings were an-
alyzed considering the specific research study conditions and psychi-
atric techniques employed, including “[t]he presence of idiosyncratic 
self-related information, an imagination procedure during the sugges-
tion, and to a lesser extent presenting the suggestion without a photo 
depicting the specific event, were each associated with high memory 
formation rates.”174  Researchers found that when all three of the 
abovementioned conditions were present, the false memory rate 
 
166 Researchers commonly verify the occurrence of specific events during the participants’ 
childhood to ensure the integrity of the study.  Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 12. 
170 Id. at 16. 
171 30.4% of participants were categorized as having formed a false memory.  Id. at 28. 
172 53.3% of the participants were considered to have accepted the false suggested event as 
an authentic childhood memory, to some extent.  Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
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increased to more than forty-six percent of participants175 and the ac-
ceptance rate increased to nearly seventy percent.176 
Overall, the research demonstrates that if a false event is im-
plied, or otherwise suggested, and evidence is afforded that the inci-
dent occurred, if opposition to contemplating the probability that the 
event occurred can be overcome, and “if imagination is employed, then 
false autobiographical memories often arise.”177  Many individuals 
who report having recovered a repressed memory have done so with 
the intent to uncover some underlying trauma that may be at the root 
of their present-day struggles.178  The human mind’s ability to accept 
a suggested event, and construct a false memory, is terrifying for the 
obvious effects on an individual’s mental health because the subject 
sincerely believes the false event to be an authentic memory; this is a 
clear and disturbing invasion of privacy because an implanted memory 
is an infiltration into the parts of the mind held most sacred to an indi-
vidual.  Furthermore, false-constructed memories become even more 
dangerous when they have the ability to incarcerate innocent people, 
and this dangerous consequence becomes increasingly more likely in 
jurisdictions that have extended the statute of limitations for their crim-
inal prosecution in cases involving allegations of sexual abuse that oc-
curred when the complainant was a minor.179 
 
175 46.1% of participants constructed a false memory “when idiosyncratic self-related in-
formation, an imagination procedure during the suggestion, and to a lesser extent presenting 
the suggestion without a photo depicting the specific event” were present study conditions.  
Id. 
176 69.7% of participants accepted the false event, to some degree, as an authentic memory, 
given the abovementioned study conditions.  Id. 
177 Id. at 29. 
178 Consider licensed therapist Barbara Snow, who voluntarily placed herself on vocational 
probation with Utah’s state Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, in 2008, 
following allegations of professional misconduct which included implanting false memories 
in her family members.  Lisa Rosetta, Embattled Therapist Agrees to Probation, The Salt Lake 
Tribune (January 22, 2008, 1:49am), https://ar-
chive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=%2Fnews%2Fci_8332832 “Snow was involved in the prose-
cutions of a string of child sex abuse cases in the 1980s.  One man she testified against was 
granted a new hearing after the Utah Supreme Court questioned her credibility.  Another man’s 
conviction was upheld.”  Id.   
179 33A CARMODY-WAIT 2d § 186:12. (2019). 
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IV.  NEW YORK’S CHILD VICTIMS ACT 
New York is a leader in the movement to extend the statute of 
limitations in cases involving childhood sexual abuse.180  In early 
2019, both the New York State Senate and the Assembly approved 
modifications to the Child Victims Act which allows the victims of 
childhood sexual abuse to file criminal charges until the time they turns 
fifty-five years old.  Prior to this legislation, the ability to file a crimi-
nal complaint was restricted to victims under the age of twenty-three 
years old.181  This change in legislation will certainly increase the num-
ber of criminal complaints stemming from an alleged recovered re-
pressed memory.182  Furthermore, the changes in New York’s Child 
Victim’s Act inevitably lead to complainants and witnesses testifying 
to an event that occurred more than twenty or even thirty years prior to 
the formal commencement of criminal proceedings. 
Furthermore, the legislation provides a “look back” period to 
restore claims previously barred by the statute of limitations.183  The 
law creates a window of time, extending one year, which shall com-
mence six-months from the act’s effective date, allowing previously 
time-barred claims to be filed in both civil and criminal court.184  This 
presents a flagrant constitutional issue.  The Court in Stogner v. Cali-
fornia,185  held the retroactive use of newly enacted statutes of limita-
tions to restore criminal claims formerly time-barred violates the 10th  
amendment’s Ex-Post Facto Clause of the U.S Constitution.186  
 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Marie Napoli, Child Victims Act Is a Step Toward Healing, New York Law Journal 
(Online), March 7, 2019 https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/b21ca632-fe1d-422a-b51a-
60af0a35902b/?context=1000516. 
184 Id. 
185 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
186 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.; See also Stogner, 539 U.S. at 612 (citing Justice Chase 
more than two-hundred years prior in Calder v. Bull, supra: 
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and 
the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done 
before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, crimi-
nal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or 
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes 
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed 
to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of 
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required 
at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the 
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Stogner v. California involved a California state law that was remark-
ably analogous New York Child Victim’s Act.187  In 1993, the Califor-
nia state legislature enacted a statute permitting:   
Prosecution for those crimes where “[t]he limitation pe-
riod specified in [prior statutes of limitations] has ex-
pired”--provided that (1) a victim has reported an alle-
gation of abuse to the police, (2) “there is independent 
evidence that clearly and convincingly corroborates the 
victim’s allegation,” and (3) the prosecution is begun 
within one year of the victim’s report. A related provi-
sion, added to the statute in 1996, makes clear that a 
prosecution satisfying these three conditions “shall re-
vive any cause of action barred by [prior statutes of lim-
itations].”188 
In Stogner, the defendant was charged with sex-related child 
abuse in 1998 for acts that allegedly occurred between 1955 and 
1973.189  At this time, the statute of limitations for this crime was three-
years and that period expired at least twenty-two years prior to the 
state’s petition.190  The Court found the statute to be “unfairly retroac-
tive” as applied to the case at bar and further held that “ a law enacted 
after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates 
the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-
barred prosecution.”191   
Although this constitutional prohibition may bar future crimi-
nal allegations filed pursuant to New York’s “look back” period, it 
does not extend to civil suits filed during this window.192  Furthermore, 
the New York State Court of Appeals held that the legislature “may 
constitutionally revive a personal cause of action” under the reasonable 
determination that “the circumstances are exceptional and are such as 
to satisfy the court that serious injustice would result to plaintiffs not 
guilty of any fault if the intention of the legislature were not 
 
offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and oppres-
sive.” Calder, supra, at 390-391, 1 L Ed 648 (emphasis altered from orig-
inal). Id. 
187 Stogner, 539 U.S. at 609. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 609-10. 
190 Id. at 610. 
191 Id. at 633. 
192 Napoli, supra note 183. 
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effectuated.”193  These exceptional circumstances were found to exist 
in the case of latent effects resulting from exposure to toxic sub-
stances,” though time will determine whether child sexual abuse will 
be considered an analogous exceptional circumstance.194   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The human memory involves  “the construction or reconstruc-
tion of experiences where a person may blend later occurring details 
into the memory of an event.”195  The passage of time weakens the 
mind’s memory of an event and, the memory is more susceptible to 
contamination following the event.196  Moreover, the American Medi-
cal Association categorizes recovered repressed memories of child-
hood abuse “to be of uncertain authenticity.”197  Additionally, the as-
sociation cautioned that: “[t]he use of recovered memories is fraught 
with problems of potential misapplication,”198 and existing clinical and 
scientific evidence cannot distinguish accurate memories from those 
that are fabricated and inaccurate absent independent information cor-
roborating the event’s occurrence.199  The memory is inherently falli-
ble, consisting of merely two functions, construction and reconstruc-
tion, and in spite of true crime novels, there is no scientific evidence 
supporting the belief that the mind can flawlessly preserve a memory, 
and further, conceal a memory from an individual’s conscious recol-
lection.200   
Therefore, criminal allegations based solely upon recently re-
covered repressed memories should not be admissible within the con-
text of formal criminal proceedings because the notion of recovering a 
preserved memory holds no scientific credibility.201  The unconscion-
ability of the criminal allegation cannot hinder the accused’s right to 
 
193 Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 301 N.Y. 164, 174-75, 93 N.E.2d 620 (1950). 
194 See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989) (upholding the New York 
State legislature’s discovery rule for “latent effects of exposure to any substance” and simul-
taneous one-year revival of lapsed actions because operation of “the exposure rule prevented 
the bringing of timely actions,” and “an injustice has been rectified.”). 
195 March, supra note 69. 
196 Id. (citing testimony from Dr. Elizabeth Loftus in which she explained that “a false 
memory is a false belief accompanied by sensory detail.”). 
197 Piper, supra note 112, at 230-31. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Lynn, supra note 121, at 541–54. 
201 March, supra note 69. 
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due process under the law.  President John F. Kennedy, while deliver-
ing the 1962 Yale University Commencement Address, poignantly 
stated that “[f]or the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—
deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth—persistent, persua-
sive, and unrealistic.”202  The myth that the mind has the ability to sup-
press, persevere, and furthermore, recover a repressed memory of a 
traumatic event may be sympathetic, persistent and persuasive; it is 
nonetheless, unrealistic and materially, it is inconsistent with the stand-
ard promulgated, by the Supreme Court in Daubert and the rule codi-
fied by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
202 President John F. Kennedy, Yale University Commencement Address (June 11, 1962). 
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkyalecommencement.htm. 
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